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Abstract
Ce papier analyse les proble`mes lie´s a` l’imple´mentation du sche´ma Equal Labour
Income Equalisation (ELIE) propose´ par Kolm (2005). Il e´tudie successivement l’influence
de l’incertitude dans la connaisance des revenus indivduels, l’impact des e´chelles d’e´quiva-
lence et finalement les conse´quences de l’accumulation du capital. Si l’incertitude ne
modifie pas fondamentalement les proprie´te´s d’e´quite´ de ELIE, les e´chelles d’e´quivalences
peuvent avoir des cosne´quences non triviales en fonction de la relation entre fertilite´ et
revenu. Enfin, l’accumulation du capital introduit de fortes ine´galite´s dans la taxation.
Le papier repose sur des simulations calibre´es de la distribution des revenus en France et
sur l’utilisation des divers indices de taxation.
Abstract
This paper analyses the problems linked to the implementation of the Equal Labour
Income Equalisation (ELIE) scheme proposed by Kolm (2005). It successively studies the
influence of uncertainty in the knowledge of individual incomes, the impact of equivalence
scales and finally the consequences of capital accumulation. If uncertainty does not mod-
ify fundamentally the equity properties of ELIE, equivalence scales can have non trivial
consequences depending on the relation between income and fertility. Finally, capital ac-
cumulation introduces strong inequalities in taxation. The paper relies on simulations of
the income distribution, calibrated on French data and on the use of taxation indices.
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1 Introduction
Macrojustice, as discussed in Kolm (2005) concerns the rules for distributing the benefits of the
main social resources. Because initial dotations are unequally distributed including human
capacities, macrojustice implies some kind of redistribution which depends on the socially
accepted degree of solidarity or altruism. Kolm (2005) considers that the main resources are
labour capacities so that redistribution should imply an equal labour income equalisation or
ELIE. ”Practically, each individual receives or yields in proportion to the difference between
her wage rate and the average, the proportion being the equalisation labour. Hence, a difference
in productivity is compensated by a proportional difference in income transfer.” As capital
was initially produced by labour, the real means of production at the steady state are labour
and natural resources. The contribution of labour to total resources is accounted for 97%.
Consequently, Kolm (2005) assumes that the question of taxation can be centred on labour
only: Labour is the main source of income in society.
This being said, let us turn to usual public finance theory in order to situate the possible
impact of ELIE. Public finance has different aims and functions that can be summarised as
follows.
- A redistributive function which is based essentially on progressive income tax and vari-
ous policies of assistance such as the RMI (minimum income for insertion) in France or
allowances for old people. Obviously an implementation of ELIE should replace these
existing taxes and transfers.
- An incentive function. For instance, a carbon tax aiming at reducing CO2 emissions, or
family allowances that aim at promoting a greater number of children per family. ELIE
cannot be a full substitute for these taxes and transfers.
- The production of public goods. This aspect of public finance aims at organising and
improving economic growth and capital accumulation. Here again, we are outside the
role and attributions of ELIE.
These functions cannot of course be totaly independent one from another. But we would
like to be able to separate as much as possible these different effects. We would not like
for instance that a redistributive policy might generate disincentives or that an incentive
policy could have regressive distributional features. This is the reason why ELIE is based
on capacities and not on effective labour supply. As its basis for taxation is inelastic, there
should be no inefficiency disincentives for labour supply with ELIE.
Kolm (2005) assumes that the distribution of talents is perfectly known. We shall detail
a number of reasons why this might not be the case. It is thus reasonable to investigate
the sensitivity of the ELIE scheme to an uncertainty in the knowledge of the distribution of
talents. Are the basic properties greatly modified or is uncertainty only a minor problem?
This question is essential for judging the redistributive performances of ELIE. In other words,
from a purely redistributive point of view, is it worth changing the existing system for ELIE?
Modern societies and particular France are concerned with the behaviour of households
as regards to fertility decisions. Family allowances have been implemented as an incentive to
fertility. They have been quite successful in France for maintaining a decent rate of birth,
compared to other European countries. But family allowances, on the other side, might
have some unwanted redistributive effects. So what is the exact trade-off between family
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incentives and redistribution? Because of their incentive motives, they cannot be a substitute
to ELIE, but have to be a complement. How can the two systems cohabitate? How will family
allowances modify the redistributive properties of ELIE? This is also an important question.
Kolm (2005) does not consider capital income by arguing that physical capital is itself
produced by labour, so that for macrojustice (not for microjustice) capital can be neglected.
This can be true in a steady state, but it ignores the question of accumulation and economic
growth and so does not give any hint on how to investigate the trade-off between growth
and redistribution. On one hand, individual saving rates rise with the level of income. Any
redistributive scheme, by transferring resources from rich to poor tends to lower the aggregate
rate of saving and by consequence the rate of capital accumulation. On the other hand, capital
income modifies the total income distribution and has a strong influence on inequality. In most
countries and certainly in France, wealth inequality is much stronger than income inequality.
To answer the above questions, we shall have to formalise the ELIE scheme in various
contexts. The basic ELIE formula is simple and linear. But this attractive simplicity hides
in fact many non trivial properties. For instance, the degree of redistribution depends on
the characteristics and shape of the initial gross income distribution. When mixed with
other public finance mechanisms, the initial model is also much complexified. For these two
reasons (shape of the distribution, and more complex models), we have to resort to simulation
techniques. We have clearly two ways of proceeding. We could start from a microeconomic
sample of French wages and simulate from this empirical distribution. The alternative solution
is to simulate a given density and calibrate its parameters so as to match some inequality
or redistributive indices computed from the empirical distribution of gross or net incomes in
France. de la Croix and Lubrano (2008) adopt the same type of calibrated simulation as well
as many authors do in the literature. This approach is much simpler to implement because
it is easier to get the figures for some indexes than the figures of individual incomes collected
from household surveys. Moreover, calibrated simulation is more adapted when one want
to study variants of the original model, because in this case, the income distribution can be
simulated in different way across the variants of the initial model.
A fiscal system has been characterised in the econometric literature by a number of indices
that we recall in the appendix. They are, apart from the well-known Gini index, the progres-
sivity index of Kakwani (1977), the vertical equity index of Reynolds and Smolensky (1977)
and the horizontal inequity index of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981). We detail these
indices in an appendix, because it is rather difficult to find a comprehensive presentation of
the related literature which might not be well known to all the readers of this book.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we give a mathematical presentation of
the ELIE scheme. In section 3, we simulate this model and verify its redistributive properties.
We show that a small value of the fundamental redistributive parameter is needed in order
to obtain the same degree of redistribution that exists in France. With section 4, we enter
the core of the debate, examining the consequences of uncertainty in the knowledge of the
distribution of talents. In section 5, we introduce family allowances while section 6 details a
growth model a` la Solow Solow (1956) to investigate the relation between capital accumulation
and income distribution. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The initial formulation of the model
The economy we consider is composed of n individuals with a labour supply ℓi and a potential
wage rate of wi corresponding to individual capacities or productivities. Taxation bears on wi,
independently of ℓi, the effective quantity of supplied labour. That, with the assumption that
there is a total freedom for the amount of labour supplied, means that there is no interaction
between labour supply and taxation. Consequently, the question of optimal taxation can
be treated in a first best framework provided that wage rates or productivities are perfectly
known. Kolm imagines a self-financing distributive system where taxes and subsidies, both
noted ti, balance with
∑
ti = 0. As labour is the main resource, taxes and subsidies are
measured in terms of a quantity of labour. An equal quantity of labour k is taken from each
individual and measured at his productivity so the tax is equal to kwi. Meantime, an equal
amount kw˜, to be determined, is redistributed to each individual so that the net transfer for
individual i is equal to
ti = k(w˜ − wi). (1)
The value of k has to be chosen by society while w˜ is determined by the assumption that
transfers are totaly financed by taxes. As a matter of fact, the system must verify
∑
ti = 0⇒ k(nw˜ −
∑
wi) = 0. (2)
This equation has only two solutions. Either k = 0 or w˜ =
∑
wi/n = w¯. Thus w˜ is equal to
the mean wage w¯. It plays a central role in the system and we shall call it here the pivot.
Remark : 1 w¯ determines the position of richer and poorer individuals. In the EU and in
the UK as well, any individual with an income below a fraction of the mean income in society
is considered as poor. In France, the same definition uses instead the median. When the
income distribution is not symmetric, this makes a difference. So the choice of w¯ as a pivot
is not neutral.
When accounting for taxes and transfers, disposable income or net total income is given by
yi = wiℓi + k(w¯ − wi) = kw¯ + wi(ℓi − k). (3)
In this framework, taxation is based on capacities and not on actual income. So that an
individual determines his labour supply independently of k. But he is implicitly constrained
to work at least for k days. Everybody receives the same basic income kw¯ plus a fraction
ℓi − k of his labour productivity. This is the Equal Labour Income Equalisation or ELIE.
ELIE is thus a kind of universal basic income.1 Everybody receives kw¯. At the difference of
a usual basic income, the financing mechanism is already contained in the definition of ELIE
as everybody also pays kwi for financing the system.
3 Characterising the initial model
We start from an hypothetical population of n = 10 000 individuals. For the time being, we
restrict our attention to individuals, leaving the question of household composition to section
1The interpretation of ELIE as a basic income mechanism is uncontroversial when everybody is working.
It can lead to controversies when there are inactive individuals.
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5. We suppose also that wages are for the while the sole income. These two hypothesis charac-
terise the initial simple model of Kolm. We are here interested in exploring the consequences
of wage heterogeneity on redistribution, or in other words to show that ELIE properties heav-
ily depends on the shape of the gross income distribution. We shall thus simulate a calibrated
distribution of gross income and analyse the resulting distribution of net income (after taxes
and transfers) when k varies. In the original model of Kolm, labour supply is exogenous. So
for the ease of simulation, we shall simply suppose that ℓi = 1. Consequently, the net total
disposable income (3) is transformed into
yi = wi + k(w¯ −wi) (4)
This assumption is a non trivial one. In the original model, wi is the hourly wage rate which
has to be multiplied by ℓi or order to get the gross income ℓiwi. Assuming ℓi exogenous
and equal to 1 means that wi now represents gross labour income. In a way the first best
framework is lost, in another way is it kept because ℓi is supposed to be exogenous. The
model also supposes that wi is perfectly known. We shall relax this last assumption in section
3.
We suppose that gross wages are distributed according to a Gamma distribution:
f(w|ν, s) = 1
Γ(ν)
sνwν−1e−w s.
We recall that the mean of this distribution is equal to ν/s and its variance to ν/s2. We then
impose the restriction s = ν in order to get a normalised mean of 1. 2. We have then to
calibrate this distribution by adjusting its remaining parameter ν. For a normalised mean,
the empirical distribution of gross wages can be characterised in a simple way by its Gini
coefficient. This coefficient was equal to 0.327 in France in 1998. 3 To obtain the same Gini
coefficient for our simulated sample, we had to choose ν = 2.75. Note however that these
figures are in a way not exactly comparable because here we have individuals and earnings
for the while when real data are concerned with households and total incomes. Note also
that with the Gamma distribution, very high incomes are not so well represented. In our
sample, the maximum income is 6.27 times the mean. We could have chosen another usual
distribution such as the logNormal or the Pareto without changing much the results. We
choose the Gamma for the sake of algebraic simplicity. All moments exist, contrary to the
Pareto.4
Let us now apply the ELIE scheme to this sample, taking three different values for k: 0.2,
0.3, 0.4, as suggested in Kolm (2005) so as to obtain the distribution of net incomes (after
taxes and transfers) as given by (4). A coefficient k = 0.2 corresponds to a tax rate of one
2The annual mean disposable net income in France was 28 935 euros in 2004 and the median 24 599 euros.
As we have chosen a normalized mean, the horizontal axis can be read as x times the mean. It is then easy
to interpret the right tail of the distribution. Actual income figures can be obtained just by multiplying the
figures of the horizontal axis by the empirical mean given in this footnote.
3Some of these data can be found for instance on the Web site of the World Institute for Develop-
ment and Economic research, UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0a, June 2005.
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm .
4A real alternative would have been to choose a richer distribution with much more parameters in order
to get a better tail behaviour. We can quote the Generalised Beta II distribution which has four parameters.
However, the calibration of the parameters is far from trivial. We should have used at least the deciles of
the income distribution for this purpose and not just a simple Gini coefficient. The gain for the subsequent
analysis is not clear.
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Figure 1: Income distribution before and after ELIE transfers
Multiply by 28 935 euros (the annual mean disposable net income
in France in 2004) to have an idea of the range of net incomes in
France.
working day in a five working day week. And k = 0.4 corresponds to two working days.
Figure 1 displays a non-parametric estimate of the different income distributions obtained
when varying k. We immediately notice three facts: firstly, ELIE introduces a concentration
of net incomes around the mean; secondly it raises the minimum disposable income as k
grows; thirdly, if poverty is defined an income lower than half the mean, a k greater than 0.4
is needed to totaly eliminate it (See Leroux and Leroux (2009) as an illustration).
The decrease of the Gini coefficients given in Table 1 shows that ELIE strongly reduces
inequality. But the chosen values for k entail Gini coefficients which are much lower than
that computed on French data for net incomes and which is equal to 0.27 in 2000 and 2001.
We should have chosen k = 0.17 to recover such a value for the Gini coefficient, which
would corresponds to slightly less of one working day. This is a relatively low value when
compared to the importance of social contributions and payroll taxes in France. However, we
are studying here only redistribution and redistribution, when properly measured, is rather
weak in France. For instance, income taxes are only a small part of GDP in France. In this
simple model, a rather low value for k is finally realistic. When examining various variants of
the basic model, we shall see that the French Gini coefficient for net incomes is reproduced
for increasing values of k as we depart from the original model.
It is rather easy to verify that ELIE complies with the Pigou-Dalton requirement, which
means that it does not change the mean of the distribution after taxes and transfers and that it
entails Lorenz curves that get closer to the main diagonal without crossing. A a consequence,
all concentration curves, computed on the sole basis of positive taxes are identical.5
Let us now detail various indices which characterise taxation, leaving aside transfers.
Taxes, noted tti, concern only individuals who are above the mean:
tti =
{
0 if wi ≤ w¯
k(wi − w¯) otherwise.
5For instance, as wi ∼ G(ν, ν), then by properties of the Gamma distribution, yi = (1− k)wi + kw¯ is also
Gamma with yi ∼ G(ν, ν/(1 − k)) + k. Its mean is equal to 1 and its variance to (1 − k)
2/ν. So ELIE does
not change the mean but reduces the variance.
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Figure 2: Lorenz and concentration curves associated with ELIE
Those below the mean receive only transfers. The marginal tax rate is constant and equal
to k for those paying taxes. However, despite this linear structure, ELIE is a progressive
taxation scheme. The mean taxation rate, obtained by dividing taxes by gross wages, is
txi = tti/wi = k(1− w¯
wi
). (5)
This rate grows with wi, but less than proportionally as illustrated on Figure 3. The shape
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Figure 3: Taxation rates implied by ELIE (in percentage)
of this graph, which illustrates the bearing of taxation on our particular population, depends
heavily on the shape of the distribution of income. On the contrary, the marginal rate of
taxation is constant and equal to k for individuals above the mean, and of course equal to
zero for those below the mean.
The usual index of progressivity of Kakwani (1977) is strong with 0.45 compared to its
value computed on actual French data which is only 0.31. It is not a function of k because
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of the linear structure of ELIE (constant marginal rate). It is only a function of the shape of
the distribution and of the chosen pivot for ELIE.6 A smaller index could be obtained with
a lower ν entailing stronger asymmetry and stronger initial inequality. The average fiscal
Table 1: The original ELIE model
k Mean Gini Fiscal Partial Kakwani Reynolds Atkinson Redis-
wages pressure fisc. pres. tribution
0 1.013 0.327 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.000
0.2 1.013 0.262 4.70 7.23 0.454 0.065 0.00 0.065
0.3 1.013 0.229 7.05 10.84 0.454 0.098 0.00 0.098
0.4 1.013 0.196 9.39 14.45 0.454 0.131 0.00 0.131
pressure, computed as the ratio between the sum of total taxes and the sum of gross incomes,
is very low, because only incomes which are above the mean are taxed. But even when the
fiscal pressure is computed for only those actual paying taxes, it is not very high. The amount
of inequality removed as indicated by the Reynolds index as well as the redistribution index
grows with k.
Horizontal equity, as defined in the appendix is perfect, taxes and transfers imply no rank
permutation. The Atkinson-Plotnick horizontal inequity index is always zero. This is due to
the fact that there is no effect due to family composition or to the combination of different
taxes.
We can conclude that the pure ELIE transfer scheme is a rather powerful mechanism
of redistribution. Its implementation in France would require a rather low value for k to
reproduce the same Gini coefficient for net income. However, ELIE is much more progressive.
That would mean putting the burden of redistribution more on richer people than what it is
now.
4 Uncertainty in the knowledge of wages
Wages and income are not in general perfectly known by the tax authority. The basic wage
rate can be public, but there are bonuses and extra hours for instance that can be more
difficult to know for the tax authority. These can be important for some categories. We have
then tax evasion and tax avoidance. The former is illegal but some professions are famous
for practicing it. The later is perfectly legal and results from an optimisation behaviour
as described for instance in Stiglitz (1985). Of course in this game of tax evasion and tax
avoidance, richer individuals have more opportunities than poorer ones.
We are now going to modify the initial model so as to take into account this aspect which
is important for practical implementation. We have to know how much ELIE looses of its
nice redistributive properties when it becomes difficult to have a precise knowledge of the
individual talents. We now modify the taxation scheme so that wi would be lowered by a
6The pivot is chosen here equal to the mean because the system is balanced in this case. Choosing for
instance the median would have led to an unbalanced system. The pivot can be chosen lower than the mean
if extra resources are to be collected for paying for instance civil servants and collective equipments. But in
this case the original ELIE is distorted.
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random effect ei:
ti = k(w¯ − wi − ei). (6)
We want to implement the idea that uncertainty in the knowledge of wages increases with its
level and that the importance of dissimulation is random. For that purpose, ei is a strictly
positive process and once again we chose the Gamma distribution for convenience. Its mean
will depend on the level of wi and on its rank in the distribution. The maximum rate of tax
avoidance (expressed as a fraction of gross income) is supposed to be 30%. More precisely, if
the wi are sorted in increasing order, we shall have
ei ∼ 0.3 i
n
wiG(ν, ν), (7)
where G(ν, ν) means the Gamma distribution. This formula implies that ei is positive with
a mean equal to 0.3 ∗ wi ∗ i/n and a variance equal to (0.3 ∗ wi ∗ i/n)2/ν. The richer people
will on average manage to hide 30% of their income while the poorer people will manage to
hide a negligible part of it. For the system to be balanced, the pivot has to be taken equal
to the mean of the declared wages wi − ei and no longer equal the mean of the exact wages
wi. Introducing a random dissimulation entails little changes when compared to the initial
Table 2: ELIE and uncertainty in the knowledge of wages
k Mean Gini Fiscal Kakwani Reynolds Atkinson Redistribution
wages pressure
0.0 1.013 0.327 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000
0.2 1.013 0.282 3.16 0.437 0.044 0.0000 0.044
0.3 1.013 0.261 4.73 0.437 0.066 0.0002 0.066
0.4 1.013 0.239 6.31 0.437 0.089 0.0003 0.088
Table 1. Redistribution is of course weaker as well as the fiscal pressure on richer people. A
weak horizontal inequity appears due to the random character of the modeled tax avoidance.
In order to get a Gini of 0.27, we must chose a k = 0.24, a value slightly higher than in the
original case where a value of k = 0.17 was sufficient.
Despite the fact that we have introduced a rather strong possibility of tax avoidance and
evasion, the final influence is weak. We just have to increase k in order to get the same
amount of inequality. Redistribution is simply slightly less important. Taxing capacities
instead of incomes seems a crucial hypothesis because incomes are rather easy to measure
whereas capacities are not. The results of this section show that finally this hypothesis is not
so crucial because when relaxing it, the main properties of the model are not so much altered.
We must however keep in mind that that we have supposed that labour supply is exogenous
and thus does not depend on the value of k.
5 Family allowances and family composition
ELIE is a fair and powerful redistributive scheme with nice labour incentives properties.
However, incentives are not limited to the labour market, as underlined in the introduction.
In this section, we want to investigate how the pure redistributive ELIE mechanism can
interact with the incentive mechanism of family allowances.
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Family allowances exists in many European countries and are very important in France.
They have been successfully designed to increase natality. With family allowances, we have a
mechanism which mixes redistribution and incentives. Clearly, ELIE cannot be a substitute
for family allowances, simply because it is not a targeted mechanism. If we want to experiment
the feasibility of implementing ELIE in France, we have to study the properties of a mix
system combining ELIE with a complementary mechanism of redistribution based on family
composition and not solely on the position of gross income versus mean income.7
5.1 ELIE and household composition
The basic unit i is no longer an individual but a household. We suppose that a household
is composed of two adults earning the same amount each and a random number of children
noted chi that can be zero.
8 The relationship between income and fertility is rather con-
troversial. Becker (1981) argues for a positive relationship on the ground that children are
consumer goods competing with alternative goods. But he also put forward a trade-off be-
tween quality of education and quantity, so that the relation can be negative (see also De la
Croix and Doepke (2003) for an alternative point of view). How could we decide between
these alternative views? We had access to survey data collected from interviews in Marseilles
in 2006 at the occasion of an exercise in experimental economics concerning willingness to
pay for a better air quality. The sample is made of 549 individuals, coming from distinct
households for which we have the number of children, the total net income of the household
and the marital status of the responder. We can thus run a regression which links the number
of children to family income and marital status. Cel is a dummy variable indicating if the
responder is single or not. Expressed in logarithms, this regression has a low R2 = 0.205, but
clearly indicates a slightly positive relation between fertility and family income as we have:
ln(1 + chi) = 0.034
[0.16]
+ 0.061
[2.43]
ln(1 + wi)− 0.40
[−9.01]
cel.
Following this regression9, we shall suppose that the number of children follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter θ (which represents both the mean and the variance) and we
note chi ∼ P (θ). The average number of children in France is two per family. We suppose
that part of the fertility decision is independent of income, say for the first child, but that the
decision for an extra child depends on income. We have thus chosen θ = 1+wi/w¯. The realised
number of children in a family for the 10 000 households of the sample lies in the interval
[0,9]. In Figure 4, we compare the distribution of the number of children in a household when
fertility depends on gross income to a distribution that would suppose that fertility is totaly
independent of income, while keeping the same mean. Clearly, the assumption that fertility
depends on income has a strong influence on the decision to have a second child, but lowers
the probability to have more than 3 children for the given gross income distribution.
As we now define the income distribution of a household and no longer the income dis-
tribution of an individual, comparisons between households become more difficult. Clearly a
7In France, family allowances are independent of income, except for the complement familial which is
proportional to wages.
8We exclude for simplicity mono-parental households. This is certainly a limitation of our analysis. We are
concerned with the whole French income distribution, of which households with a single adult are a significant
fraction. We also do not introduce the possibility of income disparities between the two parents and their
consequences on taxation.
9A non-parametric regression, not reported here, indicates also a positive and quasi linear relation.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of children for the two scenarios
couple with many children has not the same needs as a couple without any children. We have
to introduce an equivalence scale in order make household incomes comparable. We have
chosen a rather mild equivalence scale which gives a weight of 1 to the first adult, 0.7 to the
second adult and 0.3 to each child. This is a mix between the Oxford equivalence scale and
the OECD equivalence scale. Let us call sni the number thus obtained for household i. If we
divide wi by this number, we have an income expressed in terms of family needs. The basic
ELIE formula is changed into:
yi
sni
= 2
wi
sni
+ 2 k
(
w¯s − wi
sni
)
(8)
where w¯s = n
−1
∑
iwi/sni.
5.2 The influence of equivalence scales
Might ELIE gain some incentive properties for fertility decisions just by using an equivalence
scale without introducing a specific family allowance mechanism? The answer might depend
on the assumption made for fertility which determines in which type of family children are
located. It is thus wise to consider two variants: one where fertility is independent of income
and one where it is income dependent. Let us first suppose that the number of children per
household is drawn from a Poisson distribution with θ = 2. We have simulated an income
distribution for 10 000 households composed of two adults earning each the same wi and
having a random number of children, independent of their income. Results are displayed in
In Table 3. In column U , we have divided the total gross household income by 2 (the number
of adults in the household) while in column S, total income is divided by an equivalence scale
depending on the number of children. We then apply the usual ELIE scheme on the resulting
scaled income, using (8). Considering an equivalence scale slightly increases inequality, fiscal
pressure and decreases redistribution. The order of magnitude of these changes is small, but
significant. It would be stronger with a different equivalence scale. Column U is identical to
the initial case of section 3. With an equivalence scale, the French Gini coefficient is recovered
for k = 0.19 instead of k = 0.17 when there is no equivalence scale.
Let us now consider the income distribution conditional on the number of children. What
is the more favourable system for large families? In Table 4, we give the mean income of the
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Table 3: Equivalence scales and ELIE
with a random fertility
k = 0.0 k = 0.2 k = 0.3 k = 0.4
U S U S U S U S
Gini 0.327 0.342 0.262 0.273 0.229 0.239 0.196 0.205
Fisc. pres. 0.000 0.000 4.697 4.911 7.045 7.366 9.393 9.821
Kakwani 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.448 0.454 0.448 0.454 0.448
Reynolds 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.068 0.098 0.103 0.131 0.137
In columns U, household income is divided by 2, while in columns
S it is divided by an equivalence scale.
10 000 households having zero, one, two, three and more children. We give the total income
after ELIE taxes and transfers, the exact income that the household will have in its pocket,
once transfers are operated. This figure is obtained by re-multiplying the net income obtained
in (8) by sni. In column k = 0 of Table 4, there is of course no difference between U and
Table 4: Total net income per family
with a uniform fertility
k = 0.0 k = 0.2 k = 0.3 k = 0.4
Children U S U S U S U S
0 2.062 2.062 2.054 1.959 2.051 1.907 2.047 1.856
1 2.025 2.025 2.025 1.984 2.025 1.963 2.025 1.943
2 2.025 2.025 2.025 2.039 2.025 2.046 2.025 2.053
3 2.018 2.018 2.020 2.088 2.020 2.123 2.021 2.158
> 3 2.003 2.003 2.008 2.160 2.010 2.239 2.012 2.317
S. For k > 0, the U columns are simply an estimate of the conditional mean of the income
distribution. The computed marginal mean income is equal to 2.025. Let us concentrate on
the columns marked S. When k is positive, ELIE seems to redistribute money as a function
of the number of children. Households with less than two children receive less that the mean
income. Household with more than two children receive more and transfers increase with the
number of children.
As a conclusion, an equivalence scale seems to introduce a trade-off between fertility
incentives and fairness.
5.3 Equivalence scales and income dependent fertility
If we believe in the incentive effect of family allowances, fertility should be assumed to depend
on income. This assumption is going to change dramatically the previous results. We have
redone the same simulation exercise as in subsection 5.2, but this time with chi ∼ P (θ)
where θ = 1 + wi/w¯ instead of θ = 2. Table 5 shows that the use of an equivalence scale
now decreases inequality as shown by the Gini indices computed on net income after ELIE
transfers, instead of increasing it as in the case of random fertility. The fiscal pressure is
lowered while progressivity is increased. Thus the dependence between fertility and income
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Table 5: Equivalence scales and ELIE
with income dependent fertility
k = 0.0 k = 0.2 k = 0.3 k = 0.4
U S U S U S U S
Gini 0.327 0.307 0.262 0.245 0.229 0.215 0.196 0.184
Fisc. pres. 0.000 0.000 4.697 4.393 7.045 6.589 9.393 8.753
Kakwani 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.465 0.454 0.465 0.454 0.465
Reynolds 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.061 0.098 0.092 0.131 0.123
has a drastic influence on the redistribution properties of ELIE when an equivalence scale is
used. This influence is now positive in term of fairness. A value of k = 0.13 is now sufficient
to get the French Gini coefficient on net income instead of k = 0.17 in the original model
without equivalence scales.
Table 6: Equivalence scales and ELIE
with income dependent fertility (continued)
k = 0.0 k = 0.2 k = 0.3 k = 0.4
Children U S U S U S U S
0 1.502 1.502 1.607 1.500 1.659 1.499 1.711 1.498
1 1.712 1.712 1.774 1.720 1.806 1.724 1.837 1.729
2 1.997 1.997 2.002 2.001 2.005 2.003 2.008 2.005
3 2.271 2.271 2.222 2.273 2.197 2.273 2.173 2.275
> 3 2.892 2.892 2.719 2.860 2.632 2.843 2.546 2.827
Let us now examine the money which actually enter the household pocket. Table 6 shows
first that before any redistribution (k = 0), the fertility model implies that households with
children have more money than households without children, while the computed average
income remains the same at 2.025. This is just a consequence of our assumption made on
fertility. When k > 0, the mean income per household type is not significantly changed.
Families with more than two children get more money with the equivalence scales and family
with less than two children get less money as in the previous configuration. So the incentive
mechanism introduced by the equivalence scales is unchanged, while the fairness properties
of the model were increased.
5.4 ELIE and family allowances
ELIE is a mechanism designed for macro justice and not for incentives, because it is not
a targeted mechanism. Its sole aim is to reduce the distance between average income and
actual income, independently of any other factors. We have here introduced a new dimension,
which is family composition and its corollary equivalence scales. Depending on the modeling
of fertility, the use of an equivalence scale can confer to ELIE some incentive properties, but
at the expense of a lower degree of fairness measured here as progressivity and inequality.
When fertility increases with income, the incentive effect disappear and fairness is restored.
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Family allowances is a sensitive topic in France and also in many other European coun-
tries. A government who would like to implement the redistributive ELIE mechanism cannot
politically suppress family allowances, even if we can truly suspect this mechanism to distort
the nice properties of ELIE. Let us try to conceive a complementary redistribution scheme
based solely on family composition and independent of income. We need extra resources in
order to finance explicit family allowances, which means distributing an amount of money
only on the basis of family composition, independently of income. The redistributive ELIE
system balances because the pivot is equal to the mean w¯s. If we choose a pivot lower than
the mean, say w¯q < w¯s, we get the needed extra amount to redistribute:
Tr = 2
n∑
i=1
k(w¯q − wi
sni
) > 0. (9)
So that net income is now defined as
yi
sni
= 2
wi
sni
+ 2 k
(
w¯q − wi
sni
)
+ Tr chi/nch, (10)
where nch is the total number of children in the complete sample. How can we calibrate
w¯q? In the ELIE scheme, the Kakwani progressivity index is independent of k, but varies
with the size of the pivot. In the previous sections, the Kakwani index was much higher
than its French value of 0.31. We can decide to chose w¯q so as to match the value of 0.31
for the Kakwani index. Compared to Table 5, inequality has slightly increased, but mainly
Table 7: Family allowances and ELIE
with income dependent fertility
k = 0.0 k = 0.2 k = 0.3 k = 0.4
Gini 0.306 0.249 0.222 0.197
FiscPres 0.000 8.154 12.231 16.308
Kakwani - 0.310 0.310 0.310
Reynolds 0.000 0.059 0.089 0.119
progressivity was calibrated to be much lower. This is translated in a huge increase in the
fiscal pressure because now much more households are taxed. The Reynolds index is smaller
indicating that taxes are less successful in reducing inequality.
Table 8 show that large families get much more money. But we have seen that this extra
amount of money is not obtained in a fair way. If ELIE had to be applied, explicit family
allowances should be avoided. Equivalence scales are enough.
6 Introducing capital stock
Kolm (2005) claims that since capital is by definition produced, the other primary resources
finally account for about 97.5% for labour and 2.5% for the non-human natural resources. So
that the problem of overall distribution in macrojustice is the allocation of the rights in the
value of productive capacities, i.e. labour capacities.10 The idea is attractive from a normative
10See also section 3.3 of Kolm (2009), this book.
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Table 8: Equivalence scales and ELIE
with income dependent fertility (continued)
k = 0.0 k = 0.2 k = 0.3 k = 0.4
Children
0 1.488 1.387 1.337 1.286
1 1.731 1.676 1.649 1.621
2 1.955 1.967 1.974 1.980
3 2.344 2.409 2.441 2.474
> 3 2.857 3.090 3.206 3.322
point of view and in a steady state, but it is not adapted if the objective is to confront the
ELIE scheme to an empirical reality. Kolm’s point of view implicitly assumes that capital
and credit markets are efficient so that there is no problem of capital reallocation in the long
term.
6.1 Stylised facts
We observe a fundamental inequality in the sharing of the fruits of capital and of labour
which sets forward the question of the efficiency of any redistributive policy. At the macro
level, the share of capital in total value added can remain relatively constant despite of large
wage rises as in the US, or experience a marked increase as in Europe and especially in France
as shown in Figure 5 and as noted in Piketty (2004). The modification of the capital share
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Figure 5: Capital share in some OECD countries
in France implied a reallocation of more than 10% of total GNP on a rather short period
of 10 years. This is more than what any fiscal redistributive policy could have operated.
At the micro level, we can notice that capital allocation remains extraordinary stable in the
long term between individuals. This is due to several reasons. There is first the question of
initial conditions in the dynamic process of wealth transmission: death duty does not manage
to reallocate efficiently ownership because rates of taxation are too low for that purpose.
Secondly, the rate of saving is different between poor and rich individuals. A high rate of
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saving is necessary for accumulation. Moreover, as documented in Direr and Weitzenblum
(2007), mostly rich individuals have access to really profitable investments. Thirdly, credit
market is rationed, banks avoid financing risky projects initiated by lower income holders as
exemplified for instance in Piketty (1994). Finally, wages and capital gains are not taxed
in the same way. In France, for the same level of income, wage earners are more taxed
than holders of capital gains. All these features put together contribute to inequality in the
income and wealth distributions. As a matter of fact, in every country, there is a stronger
inequality in wealth distribution, than in income distribution. For instance, the Gini index
for net income distribution was reported to be 0.27 in France. It rises up to 0.65 for wealth
inequality in 2004 (see for instance Cordier, Houdre´, and Rougerie (2006)).
Regulating the distribution of income between capital and labour can become thus one of
the major goals of income distribution policies. This justifies introducing capital accumulation
in the ELIE framework and see what is the performance of ELIE for regulating the inequality
in income distribution generated by capital accumulation.
6.2 General features
The model we shall use for capital accumulation11 is inspired from Solow (1956) where the
rate of saving determines the rate of accumulation. In the original growth model of Solow,
population grows at a fixed rate while there is no depreciation for capital. Here we want to
keep the labour force constant with the same wage distribution for ease of comparison with
our previous results. We shall thus suppose that the rate of growth of the labour supply is
zero while capital depreciates at a fixed rate. The fundamental properties of the model should
not be affected. We consider that there is one active generation with an economic activity
lasting for 30 periods. In this framework, we can leave aside the question of inheritance taxes
(death duty). We just have to precise initial conditions, saving behaviour and transfers.
The first key assumption concerns the rate of saving. As we have an heterogenous popu-
lation (contrary to the model of Solow), we shall suppose that the rate of saving varies across
the population. Our key assumption is that rich people save more than less rich people. More
precisely, the rate of saving will be a positive function of income. This assumption sum-
marises the stylised facts detailed above and is central to obtaining a distribution of wealth
more concentrated than the distribution of income. The second key assumption follows Direr
and Weitzenblum (2007) where only rich people have access to really profitable investments.
Capital profitability will also be dependent on income.
With this model, we want to compare two types of taxation-redistribution in the presence
of capital accumulation. In a first scenario, we introduce ELIE only for labour income. There
is a flat tax on capital income, very much like what happens in France. The fruit of these
taxes is redistributed uniformly among the individuals as would be a basic income. This
scenario aims at reproducing more or less the French situation or a minimal adaptation of
ELIE to France. The second scenario is a kind of full application of ELIE when there is
capital accumulation. Capital income is added to labour income and serves a basic to the
ELIE formula. Capital and income are equally treated.
11A complete model would have to consider overlapping generations such as in Direr and Weitzenblum
(2007). We would like, at least in a first attempt, to leave this question aside.
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6.3 A dynamic model of capital accumulation
Initial conditions are crucial for any non-stationary processes, because they have a direct
influence on their trajectories. We have calibrated the wage distribution on the French Gini
coefficient and normalised it with a mean equal to one. We have to do the same for the
initial wealth distribution. We suppose that the initial capital stock is a function of labour
income and that it is not equally distributed in such a way so as to reproduce the French Gini
coefficient computed for wealth. Our proposed formula is
s0,i = α0
wi
µr
1I(wi > w¯) + (1− α0)wi
µr
1I(wi < w¯), (11)
where µr is the mean rate of return on capital and 1I is the indicator function. With α0 = 0.75,
we get a Gini coefficient of 0.651 for the initial capital stock. These initial conditions are
interpreted as a bequeath of the previous generation. With an initial mean rate of return
of 3%, the income generated by the initial capital stock will represent roughly 39% of total
income at t = 0.
The rate of saving determines the rate of accumulation. Capital stock available at time
t, si,t comes from capital at time t− 1, si,t−1, diminished of a fixed depreciation rate δ, but
augmented of savings. It is commonly admitted that the saving rate increases with income,
but less than proportionally (see e.g. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004)). We propose
modeling the saving rate as
γi = µγ
√
wi, (12)
where µγ is a scaling parameter. The mean saving rate is equal to 15% in 2005 in France.
This rate is reproduced for µγ = 0.156. For individuals with a labour income lower than w¯,
this rate is on average equal to 12%; for individuals with a labour income greater than w¯,
this rate is equal to 19% on average, given our wage distribution.
Following Direr and Weitzenblum (2007), profitability of capital must be a function of
income to illustrate the fact that only rich individuals have access to really profitable invest-
ments. We shall suppose the rate of return on capital, ri,t, is a random variable with a mean
which is a linear function of the square root of wi and a fixed variance:
ri,t ∼ G(µr√wi, σ2r ) (13)
where G(., .) is a Gaussian random variable. At each period, we will have a new draw for the
returns. We have previously chosen µr = 0.03 and now we chose σr = 0.01. This formulation
does not exclude temporary negative returns. Capital income at time t, sri,t, is given by:
sri,t = si,tri,t, (14)
while capital stock is defined by
si,t = (1− δ)si,t−1 + γiyi,t. (15)
The growth rate of the capital stock depends on the balance between the proportion of
depreciation δ and the share of net income devoted to savings. As savings depends on net
income, the growth rate of capital is a function of k, the redistribution parameter. There is
a clear trade-off between growth and redistribution. Net income is given by the combination
of labour income, capital income and the implementation of a given redistribution scheme.
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Table 9: The trade off between growth and inequality
k Mean net Mean capital Mean capital Gini net Gini capital Gini capital
total inc. share stock income income stock
Initial situation
0.000 1.659 0.389 16.540 0.417 0.706 0.651
ELIE on labour income only
0.00 1.670 0.393 17.004 0.410 0.680 0.601
0.20 1.660 0.390 16.842 0.367 0.673 0.590
0.30 1.655 0.388 16.761 0.346 0.670 0.584
0.40 1.650 0.386 16.680 0.324 0.666 0.578
ELIE on total income
0.000 1.684 0.399 17.240 0.470 0.692 0.619
0.200 1.660 0.390 16.842 0.367 0.673 0.590
0.300 1.648 0.385 16.650 0.318 0.664 0.575
0.400 1.636 0.381 16.462 0.269 0.654 0.561
In our first scenario, ELIE is applied only to labour income, while capital income is taxed
at a fixed rate τ of 20% (a realistic value in the French context). The product of capital
taxation is used to finance a basic income. We have:
yi,t = wi − k(wi − w¯) + (1− τ)sri,t + alt/n, (16)
where alt is the fruit of taxation on capital income and is given by
alt = τ
∑
i
sri,t. (17)
We can now calibrate δ. As there is a trade-off between capital growth and redistribution,
we chose δ so as to maintain over the 30 periods a constant ratio between capital income and
total income for a given value of k. For k = 0.3, the corresponding value of δ is found to be
0.0175.
In our second scenario, capital and labour incomes are treated in the same way (which
they are not in reality). We add capital and labour income and then apply the ELIE formula
to total income;
yi,t = wi + sri,t − k(w¯cap − wi − sri,t), (18)
with w¯cap = n
−1
∑
(wi + sri,t). Simulating these two variants for our 10 000 individuals will
give us clues on the properties of ELIE in the presence of capital accumulation.
6.4 A trade-off between growth and inequality
We first analyse the trade-off between growth and inequality in our simple calibrated growth
model. Table 10 clearly illustrates the trade-off resulting from ELIE. Increasing k deceases
the net total income but also inequality both for net income, capital income and capital stock.
There is still more inequality on capital income than on labour income. The two systems of
taxation-redistribution, that is to say, on one side ELIE applied only to labour income but
18
coupled with a flat tax on capital income, and a basic income and on the other side the full
ELIE applied to the sum of labour and capital income, are strictly equivalent for k = 0.2. But
for greater values of k, the full ELIE is much more powerful to reduce inequality. For k = 0.2,
the share of capital income increases slightly in both cases, compared to the initial situation.
For k = 0.3, it diminished with the full ELIE while it remains slightly constant in the first
scenario. The redistributive power of ELIE is made even more apparent if we examine Figure
6 which displays for both scenarios the income distribution. With the full ELIE, the right
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Figure 6: Income distribution with capital accumulation
tail of the income distribution is much flatter. The group of very rich individuals is strongly
and negatively affected by ELIE taxes. With a progressive taxation, the extreme right tail
disappears. Moreover, the importance of this group collapses for earners beyond 5 times the
mean, while individual around twice the mean beneficiate largely from the full ELIE scheme.
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Figure 7: Capital distribution
The change of the initial income distribution has its roots in the modification of capital
distribution as illustrated in Figure 7. Initial conditions are largely modified after thirty
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Table 10: The trade off between growth and inequality
k Mean net Gini Fiscal Kakwani Reynolds
total inc. total inc. pressure
ELIE on labour income only
0.00 1.670 0.410 7.868 0.214 0.053
0.20 1.660 0.367 10.663 0.238 0.092
0.30 1.655 0.346 12.072 0.247 0.111
0.40 1.650 0.324 13.490 0.254 0.131
ELIE on total income
0.000 1.684 0.470 0.000 - 0.000
0.200 1.660 0.367 6.945 0.350 0.092
0.300 1.648 0.318 10.298 0.352 0.136
0.400 1.636 0.269 13.574 0.355 0.179
periods, because everybody can save and accumulate in our model, even if all are not equal
in their opportunities and saving rates. But the capital distribution is still bimodal. The full
ELIE has a larger impact on holders of capital stock greater than 60 times the mean wage. The
full ELIE is able to greatly diminish their importance. This corroborates the remarks made
in Piketty (2001) on the disappearance of large fortunes at the beginning of the XXth century
with the introduction of a progressive taxation on income. However, the redistributive scheme
of ELIE should be combined with a careful study for tuning death duties. Initial conditions
are of a considerable importance, even after 30 periods, to determine the shape of the capital
distribution.
6.5 Analysing taxation
The previous picture can be completed by analysing some taxation indices. For k = 0.20,
we have seen that the macroeconomic situation is the same for both scenarios. However, we
see now that the full ELIE system implies a lower fiscal pressure and a stronger progressivity
of taxation in order to achieve at the same redistribution. Fiscal pressure starts to become
greater with the full ELIE only for k = 0.40. Finally, we note that with capital accumulation,
our calibrated model needs a k = 0.40 together with the full ELIE in order to reach the French
value of 0.270 for the Gini coefficient on net income. We can thus conclude that introducing
capital accumulation leads to a very strong modification of the income distribution and of the
ELIE principle of equity based on the sole labour factor. Clearly, ELIE has to be completed
by a taxation redistribution of bequeath.
7 Conclusion
The ELIE scheme is a principle of taxation and transfers that has many attractive properties
in terms of macrojustice and equity. In this paper, we have tried to address the question of its
implementation. We examined that nice principle of taxation-redistribution and tried to see
how its properties would be transformed when it has to be applied in a specific context with its
own characteristics where everything cannot be erased. Taxation systems cannot be changed
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completely in one year. Reformation is always discussed at the parliament which means that
some categories will pay or receive more or less than what the original idea would imply.
In France family allowances are historically very important and certainly been successful in
maintaining a decent rate of natality, even if we have seen that their impact in term of equity
is dubious. Since capital is much more mobile than labour, the impact of capital taxation
is always discussed in terms of incentives and international fiscal competition more than in
terms of equity.
We have tried to propose options which make the basic ELIE model more realistic for
the French case. We have found that uncertainty on wages does not modify fundamentally
the properties of the model and this is a nice result. However it might lower greatly its
efficiency. Family allowances represents a greater challenge. The incentive properties of
family allowances can be recovered simply by introducing equivalence scales. Their impact
is very sensitive to the relation between income and fertility. If fertility is increasing with
income, an equivalence scale can increase the redistributive efficiency of the system in the
sense that the same degree of inequality can be obtained with a lower k. But we can have
exactly the reverse property with a different model for fertility. The incentive effect can be
greatly increased if we introduce a specific family allowance mechanism, but at cost of a huge
increase in inequality. Finally, capital accumulation has the strongest distortion impact and
changes many of the ELIE properties. In the presence of capital accumulation, ELIE should
be completed by a mechanism of taxation-redistribution on bequeath which is outside the
scope of this paper.
Our model was calibrated in such a way so as to reproduce most of the inequality and
taxation indexes obtained on French data. Various values for k were considered. They are
directly linked to the desired degree of aversion for inequality in society. In the pure ELIE
model, k had to be rather low to fit French data. But in this basic model, the income distri-
bution does not reproduce correctly the importance of high incomes. A model with capital
accumulation is necessary to obtain an distribution representing correctly high incomes. In
this case k has to be rather high in order to reproduce the value of the various taxation
indexes. The determination of k thus heavily depends on the model considered. The more we
depart from the original model, the greater k has to be. Further investigation is needed so as
to estimate the desired degree of aversion for inequality in society. Many papers have been
written on this topic. Building on the seminal work of Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970), we
can quote Gevers, Glejser, and Rouyer (1979) followed by Van Praag, Goedhart, and Kapteyn
(1980) or Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn (1999), all using experiments and questionnaires. This is
planned for future work.
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APPENDIX : About the instruments
Most of the indices used in the literature devoted to taxation and transfer analysis are
based on the geometry of the Gini index. Let us start from a series of gross income X with
density f(x) and distribution F (q). The Lorenz curve is defined as
p = F (q)⇒ LX(p) = 1
x¯
∫ q
0
xf(x) dx.
Let us now suppose that the observations have been ordered in ascending order. The Lorenz
curve can be estimated using
LX(p = i/n) =
1
n x¯
i∑
j=1
xj.
The Lorenz curve indicates the proportion LX(p) of total income that is hold by the proportion
p of the total population. Perfect equity corresponds to the main diagonal LX(p) = p. The
Gini index G is defined as the surface between that diagonal and the Lorenz curve:
G = 2
∫ 1
0
[p − LX(p)] dp = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
LX(p)) dp
which can be approximated by, using ascending order
G = 1 +
1
N
+
1
x¯N2
N∑
i=1
(N − i+ 1)xi.
Let us now define a tax function t(x) and the amount of taxes ti = t(xi). The mean tax
rate is obtained as the ratio of total taxes by total gross income:
g =
1
x¯
∫
∞
0
t(x)f(x) dx =
t¯
x¯
.
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It will be used extensively in the next definitions. The concentration curve CT (p) indicates
the proportion of total taxes that the population holding the proportion p of the total income
pays:
p = F (q)⇒ CT (p) = 1
g x¯
∫ q
0
t(x)f(x) dx.
Let us now order the observations ti according to the ascending order of xi. The concentration
curve can be estimated by
CT (p = i/n) =
1
n g x¯
i∑
j=0
tj =
1
n t¯
i∑
j=0
tj.
A concentration index CI is defined in the same way as the Gini index as a measure of the
surface between the concentration curve and the diagonal
CI = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
CT (p) dp.
Let us go from gross income xi to net income yi by subtracting taxes ti. The concentration
curve of net incomes CY (p) gives the proportion of total net income that is held by the the
population holding the proportion p of the total gross income:
p = F (q)⇒ CY (p) = 1
(1− g)x¯
∫ q
0
[x− t(x)]f(x) dx,
which can be estimated by
CY (p = i/n) =
1
n (1− g) x¯
i∑
j=0
(xj − tj) = 1
n y¯
i∑
j=0
yj.
There exists a deterministic relationship between the three curves:
LX(p) = gCT (p) + (1− g)CY (p).
The various indexes that characterise a taxation and redistribution scheme are defined in
the same way as the Gini index. They correspond to surfaces between two Lorenz and/or
concentration curves.
The progressivity index of Kakwani (1977) measures the surface between the Lorenz
curve associated to gross incomes and the concentration curve of taxes. It characterises
progressivity as a departure from proportionality:
K = 2
∫ 0
1
[LX(p)− CT (p)]dp = CIT −GX .
This index is positive if a tax is progressive, equal to zero if the tax is proportional and
negative if the tax is regressive. The negative bound is −(1 + GX) and the positive bound
(1−GX) where GX is the Gini index for gross income xi.
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The index of vertical equity of Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) measures the reduction
in inequality brought in by taxes as the surface between the concentration curve of net income
and the Lorenz curve of gross income
RS = 2
∫ 0
1
[CY (p)− LX(p)]dp = GX −CIY .
It equivalently measures the reduction operated by taxation on the Gini index of gross income.
Because of the deterministic relationship existing between Lorenz and concentrations curves,
these two indices are related by
RS =
g
1− gK.
The index of horizontal inequity of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) is concerned
by the unequal treatment of equals or re-ranking operated by taxation. It measures the
surface between the concentration curve and the Lorenz curve of net income:
AP = 2
∫ 0
1
[CY (p)− LY (p)]dp = GY − CIY .
If taxes do not induce a rank permutation, then the concentration and Lorenz curves of net
income are identical and this index is zero. Or the Gini and concentration index of net income
are identical.
The redistributive index measures the surface between the Lorenz curve of net and
gross incomes:
IR = 2
∫ 0
1
[LY (p)− LX(p)]dp = GX −GY .
This index is at value between 0 and 1. It increases with the degree of redistribution. It
is simple to discover that this index is equal to the difference between the index of vertical
equity and the index of horizontal inequity: IR = RS−AP.
For more details on the topic, see Lambert (2001), Duclos and Tabi (1999) or Essama-
Nssah (2000).
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